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1. Introduction
Frictions in dynamic macroeconomic models are undoubtedly a source of hetero-
geneity, and have appealing theoretical and empirical implications. For example,
borrowing constraints may inhibit the ability of individuals to insure fluctuations in
income and this generates heterogeneous consumption outcomes, while this can have
interesting implications for the persistence of macroeconomic time series.
Nevertheless, the specification of the corresponding mechanism is a complicated pro-
cess which may involve some degree of arbitrariness which can distort parameter
identification and policy conclusions in general.
The paper demonstrates that identification in heterogeneous agent (HA) economies
can be robust to alternative assumptions regarding the underlying structure by em-
ploying identifying restrictions that are consistent with a variety of mechanisms.
These restrictions generate moment inequalities and therefore set identification.
Moment inequality restrictions have been used to characterize frictions in specific
markets, see for example Luttmer (1996) and Chetty (2012). To our knowledge, this
is the first paper that characterizes such restrictions in dynamic stochastic macroeco-
nomic models with heterogeneity and thus contributes to the literature that deals with
partial identification in structural macroeconomic models (e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004); Coroneo, Corradi, and Santos Monteiro (2011)) and the literature on appli-
cations of moment inequality models1.
Due to set identification, many models with frictions are likely to be consistent with
the robust identifying restrictions. Thus, additional data other than macroeconomic
time series can be potentially useful in order to further constrain the set of admissible
models.
1See Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015) and references therein.
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Employing aggregated survey data that are informative about the extensive margin
of adjustment e.g. the proportion of agents whose behavior is distorted over time
due to financial frictions can provide additional information that can tighten the
corresponding bounds.
The paper provides identification analysis both in an extended partial equilibrium
analytical example and in a general equilibrium setting. I apply this approach to a
benchmark heterogeneous agent model of the Spanish economy, where the proportion
of constrained consumers is identified by combining information from different sur-
veys. Empirical results suggest that controlling for variations in the extensive margin
is indeed informative.
The paper also contributes to the strand of the literature that is related to the intri-
cacies of calibration in representative agents models when the data is generated by
heterogeneous agent economies. Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) cast doubt
on using microeconomic studies as the mapping to aggregate models is affected by
aggregation and sample selection issues. Guvenen (2006) finds that estimates of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution using aggregate data reflect the behavior of
poorer agents while Constantinides and Duffie (1996) find that cross sectional het-
erogeneity is another source of bias. Chang, Kim, and Schorfheide (2013) show that
structural parameters are not invariant to policy when heterogeneity is ignored.
This paper’s empirical strategy delivers heterogeneity-consistent estimates that ac-
count for the lack of policy invariance. Survey data control both for the extensive
margin and for consumption variance, whose variation would otherwise be absorbed
by the structural parameters, bridging the gap between micro and macro elastici-
ties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an extended analysis
of the methodology in a partial equilibrium context and the informativeness of the
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extensive margin. Section 3 presents the the second order approximation of the HA
model and the corresponding aggregate identifying restrictions. Section 4 provides
identification analysis based limited information. Section 5 presents the empirical
study and Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the general identification re-
sults based on moment inequalities, the proofs and the mixed frequency model used
to measure the borrowing constrained and the prior distributions and estimates. Ap-
pendix B contains additional derivations and data explanations.
Finally, a word on notation. T signifies the length of aggregate data, and N the
number of agents. θ P Θ signifies the parameters of interest with ΘI the identified
set and ΘCSα the corresponding 1 ´ α level confidence set. Bold capital letters e.g.
Yτ denote a matrix containing observations of vector Yt up to time τ , tYjujďτ . K
signifies the orthogonal complement.
2. Credible identification - A motivating example
This section provides an illustrating analytical example on what can be learned by ob-
serving household consumption behavior. This will be relevant when we next consider
aggregate fluctuations as the arguments are similar.
Assuming an instantaneous utility function Upci,t;ωq, where ω signifies preference
related parameters, each household receives total income yi,tpli,tq which might de-
pend on labor hours supplied (li,t) and makes consumption, labor supply and savings
decisions (pci,t, li,t, si,t, q respectively) taking prices as given. Wealth can be stored
in J assets
 
aji,t
(
j“1..J earning returns R
j
i “ 1 ` rjt pajtq, and there is a general con-
straint technology gp.q that restricts trades between these assets which is increasing
in wealth2 while νji,t is the cost of accessing asset j.
2This includes popular restrictions e.g. on short selling and non-collateralized borrowing (ajt`1 ě
´a) and collateralized borrowing pajt`1 ě ´
řJ
k‰j wkakt{t`1q where wk summarize restrictions on
quantities across assets.
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The household problem is as follows:
max
tci,t,li,t,ai,t`1u8t“0
E0
8ÿ
t“0
βtUpci,t, li,t;ωq
s.t. ci,t ´ yi,tpli,tq “
Jÿ
j“1
p1` rjpaji,tqqaji,t ´
Jÿ
j“1
aji,t`1ν
j
i,t`1
ci,t ą 0 , gi
´ 
aji,t, a
j
i,t`1
(J
j“1
¯
ě 0
where we allow for asset level specific rate of return. Denoting the marginal utility of
consumption by U 1pci,t; li,t, ωq, the Euler equation for any asset j is distorted by the
non-negative Lagrange multipliers on the occasionally binding liquidity constraint,
denoted by µi,t, which are positive when the borrowing constraint is binding:
U 1pci,t; li,t, ωq “ βEt 1
νji,t`1
˜
1` rjpaji,t`1q `
Brjpaji,t`1q
Baji,t`1
aji,t`1
¸
U 1pci,t`1; li,t`1, ωq
µi,t
Bgi
´ 
aji,t, a
j
i,t`1
(J
j“1
¯
Baji,t`1
` Etµi,t`1
Bgi
´ 
aji,t`1, a
j
i,t`2
(J
j“1
¯
Baji,t`1
(1)
:“ βEt 1
νji,t`1
˜
1` rjpaji,t`1q `
Brjpaji,t`1q
Baji,t`1
¸
U 1pci,t`1; li,t`1, ωq ` λi,t
Given this setup, I next focus on what can be learned from the data in terms of the
preference parameters pβ, ωq and the unobserved endogenous variable λi,t. Since (1)
holds for all assets, it suffices to look at the condition for a savings account (or a
riskless government bond):
U 1pci,t; li,t, ωq “ β p1` rqEtU 1pci,t`1; li,t`1, ωq ` λi,t(2)
There are alternative ways of achieving identification. For example, if cross section or
panel data is available, one can split the sample into unconstrained and constrained
households using some criterion. In his seminal paper, Zeldes (1989) splits the sam-
ple using a cut-off rule on the end of period nonhuman wealth and discusses different
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rules that could have been used, as well as liquidity constraints arising from credit
market imperfections and illiquid assets as e.g. in Pissarides (1978). The importance
of illiquid assets has been recently revived by the heterogeneous agent literature, see
for example Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) and references therein, where they
also identify groups of wealthy and poor hand to mouth consumers using different
rules. However, this approach cannot be readily applied to time series data, as is the
case for aggregate data which is the focus in the rest of the paper. More importantly,
alternative choices can lead to sample selection and thus whimsical conclusions on
whether liquidity constraints are present. An alternative way is a structural treat-
ment which amounts to employing an estimated income process and compute optimal
consumption. One would therefore place much more faith on the technology of the
borrowing constraint and the nature of idiosyncratic income risk.
A more credible way to identify pβ, ωq is to use the more general implication of
borrowing constraints, which would be true across models with different types of het-
erogeneity and insurance mechanisms that would give rise to different borrowing limit
technologies (specifications for gi) and therefore λi,t3. The implication is that liquidity
constraints generate a positive discrepancy between current and next period marginal
utility of consumption, as the household cannot smooth consumption as much as it
desires4. Conditions in (1) therefore generate conditional moment inequalities, one of
which is the case of the riskless asset :
U 1pci,t; li,t, ωq ě βp1` rqEtU 1pci,t`1; li,t`1, ωq
Using income yi,tpě 0q as an instrument, the following unconditional moment inequal-
ity holds:
3Notice also that we did not specify a specific process for labor income risk. It can therefore include
any kind of individual specific risk to income as well as any kind of transfers.
4Similar restrictions also arise in the context of limited commitment and endogenous solvency con-
straints as in Alvarez and Jermann (2015).
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E rpU 1pci,t; li,t, ωq ´ βp1` rqU 1pci,t`1; li,t`1, ωqqyi,ts ě 0(3)
The inequality does not pin down a unique vector of values for pω, βq.
In order to derive explicit identification regions I simplify the model by assuming
exogenous income (so labour supply is not relevant) and I adopt the approximation
of Hall (1978) using CRRA utility Upci,t;ωq :“ c
1´ω
i,t ´1
1´ω , which implies the following
law of motion for consumption:
ci,t`1 “ ρci,t ` i,t`1 ` λ˜i,t ` φi,t(4)
where λ˜i,t ” ´pU2pci,t;ωqq´1λi,t, U2pci,t;ωq is the second derivative of the utility
function, ρ “ pβp1` rqq´
U 1pci,t;ωq
ci,tU
2pci,t;ωq “ pβp1` rqq 1ω , i,t`1 is the rational forecast error
such that Eti,t`1 “ 0 and φi,t is the residual of this approximation which is set to
zero for simplicity.5. Equivalently, consumption growth is equal to
∆ci,t`1 “ pρ´ 1qci,t ` i,t`1 ` λ˜i,t
Since higher income relaxes the budget constraint ( Covpλ˜i,t, yi,tq ă 0), the identified
set for ρ is as follows:
ρID,1 :“
ˆ
0, 1` Covpyi,t,∆ci,t`1q
Covpyi,tci,tq

“ p0, 1` ρIV s(5)
Avoiding to take a stance on the exact nature of λi,, which can involve a vast amount
of unobserved information, results in set identification. Nevertheless, we are still able
to infer certain facts about the household’s preferences and economic behavior and
conclusions are valid across alternative environments.
2.1. Bounds on Risk Aversion. Given the set of admissible values for the reduced
form coefficient ρ, we can recover the implied bounds for the risk aversion parameter,
5In a recent paper Commault (2019) challenged Hall (1978)’s random walk result for consumption
in the case of isoelastic utility. In the Appendix I clarify why the identification analysis is unaffected
by this simplification; in a nutshell, φi,t has very similar properties to λ˜i,t.
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ωID. Treating pr, βq as known, if βp1 ` rq “ 1, risk aversion is unidentified (ωID “
R`) as consumption follows a random walk. If βp1 ` rq ‰ 1, then risk aversion
is set identified and has a very intuitive interpretation, as it reflects restrictions on
preferences implied by the presence of non-diversifiable income risk. In particular, for
βp1` rq ă 1 the household is impatient and does not accumulate wealth indefinitely.
Using (5), since income and consumption growth are negatively correlated see e.g.
(Deaton, 1991), risk aversion is bounded by above and the set of values consistent
with the data is:
ωID,1 “
$&%ω P R` : ω ă } logpβp1` rqq}log ´ Covpyi,tci,tqCovpyi,tci,tq´}Covpyi,t∆ci,t`1q}¯
,.-
The stronger the negative correlation, the lower the upper bound on risk aversion,
indicating that the less risk averse household is not accumulating enough wealth to
fully insure against income risk6.
The next subsection illustrates the additional identifying information qualitative data
can provide.
The extensive margin as additional information. Suppose that we observe
the dichotomous response of the household over time to a survey question that asks
whether the household is (or expects to be in the near future) financially constrained.
An honest household will answer positively whenever λi,t ą 0. In order to analyze
the implications of observing χ˜i,t ” 1pλi,t ą 0q, I next characterize the form of λi,t
had it been generated by the model in (2) e.g. a restriction on borrowing.
For analytical tractability, consumption is approximated by a piece-wise function.
When the household is constrained, consumption is equal to cash on hand, cconi,t “
6In the language of Arellano, Hansen, and Sentana (2012) under-identification depends on this
correlation, which depends on pω, β, rq.
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xi,t :“ yi,t ` p1 ` rqai,t, while when income is not autocorrelated, unconstrained
consumption is equal to cunci,t “ p1`r´ρq1`r xi,t7.
Given the approximation, it can be shown8 that consumption growth under incom-
plete markets becomes as follows:
∆ci,t`1 “ pρ´ 1qci,t ` i,t`1 ` 1pλi,t ą 0q
ˆ
´ρci,t ` y¯i
ˆ
1´ ρ1` r p1´ Fyipx
‹
i qq
˙˙
:“ pρ´ 1qci,t ` t`1 ` 1pλi,t ą 0q pλ1ci,t ` λ0,iq(6)
where Fyipx‹i q is the the probability of hitting the constraint. The higher this prob-
ability is, the higher the savings rate out of income, increasing thereby consumption
growth.
For the analysis that follows, this is treated as the true model. Had we known the
mechanism that generates this distortion we could control for the occasionally binding
constraint using the interaction term 1pλi,t ą 0q pλ1ci,t ` λ0,iq. This would restore
point identification of ρ, ω and Eλi,t. I instead examine what can be learned from the
data without explicit knowledge of the mechanism. First, responses tχ˜i,tutďN can be
used to estimate Ptpλi,t ą 0q. Therefore, for v P R and i,t`1 with cumulative density
Φi,tp.q, the distribution function of ∆ci,t`1 is:
Ptp∆ci,t`1 ă vq “ Φi,tpv ´ pρ´ 1qci,tqPtpλi,t “ 0q ` Φi,tpv ´ pρ´ 1qci,t ´ λi,tqPtpλi,t ą 0q
ď Φi,tpv ´ pρ´ 1qci,tqPtpλi,t “ 0q ` Φi,tpv ´ ρ˜IV ci,tqPtpλi,t ą 0q(7)
where we use the only information available: that is λi,t ą 0, and that the IV regres-
sion estimate of ρ´ 1 in (6), ρ˜IV , is a lower bound9.
7Note that the assumption that income is not autocorrelated is done to simplify the argument and
its exposition and has absolutely no bearing on its substance.
8See the Appendix for the derivation.
9To see this, notice that ρ˜IV “ ρ´ 1`
`
Covpci,t, yi,tq´1Covpyi,t, λi,t | λi,t ą 0qPpλi,t ą 0q
˘ ă ρ´ 1.
The bias term is negative as higher income relaxes the constraint and can be verified by the solution
of the model, as λ1 “ ´ρ.
9
How does this additional restriction refine the set of admissible estimates for the risk
aversion parameter implied by (5)? The simplest way to show such a refinement is to
show that there exists parameter value in ρ P ρID,1 that is not consistent with (7). In
Appendix A, it is shown that using ρ˜IV as the "test point", (7) is not satisfied when
Ptpλi,t ą 0q P pgi,t, 1q(8)
where gi,t :“ Φi,tpv ´ pρ´ 1qci,tq ´ Φi,tpv ´ ρ˜IV ci,tqΦi,tpv ´ pρ´ 1qci,tq ´ Φi,tpv ´ λ0,i ´ pρ´ 1` λ1qci,tq
The upper bound in (5) is no longer admissible. To gain intuition, consider the
extreme cases where Ptpλi,t ą 0q is zero or one. Condition (8) becomes invalid as p0, 1q
and p1, 1q do not contain Ptpλi,t ą 0q. In either case, additional survey information is
redundant. When liquidity constraints are occasionally binding, survey information
matters as long as (8) is a proper interval. Figure 1 below provides an example when
Φi,t is the cumulative Normal distribution.
Figure 1. Range for v “ 0, ci,t “ 1, r “ 0.05, σ “ 0.1, y¯ “ 0
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For higher values of the intensive distortion λ1, e.g. 2λ1, concavity increases, and
the admissible range (grey shade) becomes larger. The more severe the distortions,
the more likely is that additional information matters. Conversely, in the frictionless
limit, gi,t Ñ
λiÑ0
Ptpλi,t ą 0q, contradicting (8). Survey data can provide additional
information that can narrow down the set of plausible values for ρ, ω.
2.2. Discussion.
2.2.1. Soft Constraints. The model setup employed in this section is consistent with
many environments, including those in which the household can face a different inter-
est rate for a different level of assets, given by
ˆ
Brjpaji,t`1q
Baji,t`1
˙
in the smooth case. If we
examined the condition for a different asset e.g. credit line which also involved higher
interest rates at higher levels of unsecured borrowing, then identification is restored
only if we observe the policy that relates interest rates to the level of borrowing. Oth-
erwise we are still in the world of set identification, as Brjpa
j
i,t`1q
Baji,t`1
U 1pci,t`1;ωq becomes an
unobservable variable as well, which has the same properties as λi,t. In this case, the
distortion to the Euler equation does not have to do with the insurance mechanism
itself, but rather with the fact that part of the marginal increase in the cost is not
observed. Nevertheless, the same moment inequality is valid, while survey data will
be informative as long as the household is constrained with positive probability.
2.2.2. Alternative Survey Questions. Surveys that report households that have ap-
plied for a loan and have been rejected are robust to alternative assumptions about
the economic environment. In fact, such questions also ask for the reason for which
these households have been rejected, and these reasons vary depending on individual
characteristics, employment, guarantees, changes in the institution’s credit policy,
excessive debt etcetera10. We do not claim that this is the only survey question that
10This is the case for example in the Spanish Survey of Household Finances.
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matters, but the information that is key here is the one that identifies when the in-
dividual is likely to be constrained or not, as this data provides more information
than the moment inequality that only captures average behavior and is consistent
with being constrained for e.g. 99% or 1% of the time. Such data will also be infor-
mative when we consider aggregate fluctuations, as this probability will describe the
mass of financially constrained agents over time and will be related to variations in
consumption heterogeneity and precautionary effects.
3. The second order approximation and Aggregate Restrictions
The above example investigated identification from the perspective of a observing
a single household. This section characterizes the corresponding restrictions using
macroeconomic data. Since identification is based on moment conditions, we do
not need to specify the rest of the economy to identify the structural parameters of
interest. In fact, one can focus on a few moment conditions that are the aggregate
counterparts of e.g. condition (2).
Researchers have recently employed a second order approximation to the heteroge-
neous agent model around the representative agent allocation as a tractable way of
analyzing its aggregate implications (Debortoli and Gali, 2018; Tryphonides, 2020)11.
This paper will also follow this route. In particular, looking at marginal utility of
consumption in the CRRA case:
c´ωi,t « C´ωt ´ ωC´ω´1t pci,t ´ Ctq ` ωpω ` 1q2 C
´ω´2
t pci,t ´ Ctq2
11For example Debortoli and Gali (2018) show that a simple two-agent New Keynesian (TANK)
model which abstracts completely from heterogeneity within unconstrained agents, captures rea-
sonably well the implications of a baseline HANK model regarding the effects of aggregate shocks
on aggregate variables. Tryphonides (2020) evaluates the quality of this approximation and utilizes
it to identify how heterogeneity and the extensive and intensive margins of adjustment depend on
aggregate shocks.
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In order to aggregate (2), let si,t ” pνi,t, yi,t,
 
aji,t, a
j
i,t`1
(J
j“1q and St be the vector that
includes all aggregate states, including the distribution of si,t. Aggregating the bond
Euler equation using ppsi,t|Stq, and using that agent expectations are formed using
ppsi,t`1, St`1|si,t, Stq, the approximate aggregated first order condition for bonds is
equal to:
ΞtC´ωt “ βEtC´ωt`1Ξt,t`1Rt`1 `
ˆ
λi,tppsi,t|Stqdsi,t(9)
“ βEtC´ωt`1Ξt,t`1Rt`1 ` µt
where
Ct`1 ”
ˆ
ci,t`1ppsi,t`1, si,t|St`1, Stqdpsi,t`1, si,tq, Ct ”
ˆ
ci,tppsi,t|Stqdsi,t
Ξt ” 1` ωpω ` 1q2 C
´2
t V artpci,tq, Ξt,t`1 ” 1` ωpω ` 1q2 C
´2
t`1V artpci,t`1q
Since λi,t is weakly positive by construction, the aggregate distortion to the bond
Euler equation will be a weakly positive random variable as well.
If data on the cross sectional variance of consumption is also available to the econo-
metrician, it immediately follows that -using any instrument that is positive e.g. an
aggregate random variable Xt´1- gives rise to the following moment inequality, which
is also consistent with a general equilibrium response in Rt12:
E
ˆ
C´ωt ´ βC´ωt`1
ˆ
Ξt,t`1
Ξt
˙
Rt`1
˙
Xt´1 ě 0(10)
From the above condition it is clear that there are two ways in which heterogeneity
matters for aggregate fluctuations to first order. The first is fluctuations in the cross
sectional variance, Ξt. The relevance of fluctuations in the variance of consumption
is best described by ignoring momentarily the presence of constrained consumers. In
12In a closed economy, this will put downward pressure on the interest rate which then relaxes the
borrowing constraint for some of the agents. Even if all the agents become unconstrained then the
weak inequality is still valid.
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this case, the (log-linearized) bond equation reads as follows:
C˜t “ EtC˜t`1 ´ 1
ω
Et
`
R˜t`1 ` pΞ˜t`1 ´ Ξ˜tq
˘
Growth in consumption risk increases aggregate savings and equilibrium allocations
are different even if all agents are "on their Euler equations". Measures of cross
sectional consumption variance are therefore important to account for fluctuations in
heterogeneity even if no household reports financial constraints.
Since partial insurance is the most likely result a priori, controlling only for consump-
tion risk might not be enough to capture distortions to aggregate consumption. The
next section analyzes what we learn about the aggregate distortions from combining
aggregated survey data, quantitative and qualitative.
4. Identification with Limited Information
As illustrated in the previous section, the HA model can be approximated around the
RA allocation, which results in distortions that are partially observable. Denote by
Y ft the representative agent (frictionless) model prediction,
Yt “ Y ft ` λot ` λunt
where λot is the observable component (up to the parameter vector θ) of the aggregate
distortion and λunt the unobservable component. For example, in the previous section,
Yt “ C´ωt , Y ft ” βEtC´ωt`1Rt`1, λunt ” µt and λot ” βEtC´ωt`1
´
Ξt,t`1
Ξt ´ 1
¯
Rt`1.
The only theoretical restriction on µt is its positive sign. In the absence of any addi-
tional information, theoretical or empirical, and assuming additive separability in λ0t ,
we could utilize the following moment inequality to estimate the structural parame-
ters, where Xt´1 is any positive random variable which is Yt´1 measurable:
sign pE pg pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λot pYt, Yt`1, θqqXt´1q “ sign pEpµtXt´1qq(11)
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where gpYt, Yt`1, θq :“ Yt ´ Y ft . This restriction is unlikely to point identify θ, and
could result in a quite wide confidence set. Yet, µt is a quite complicated object;
abstaining from imposing further restrictions results in more credible inference.
The question is however whether we could do better using additional information
that does not undermine the credibility of the assumptions we have already done.
One way of achieving this is to notice that the latent µt, while it depends on a lot
of information, its evolution over time can be explained by either changes in the
proportion of agents whose behavior is distorted, the extensive margin, and by how
much they distort their behavior, on average. More particularly, we can decompose
µt into two multiplicative components:
µt “ Etpµi,t|µi,t ‰ 0qPtpµi,t ‰ 0q ” κtBt
where κt is the intensive margin and Bt the extensive margin. These margins can
always be defined for a broad range of models and are consistent with a lot of hetero-
geneity. If we could find a way to measure either margin, e.g. Bt13, then this could be
utilized to sharpen inference as it generates a new set of moment inequalities, where
we utilize that Bt and κt have the same sign14:
sign
`
E pg pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λot pYt, Yt`1, θqqXt´1B´1t
˘ “ sign pEpκtXt´1qq(12)
Obviously, when Bt is zero for all t, then condition (12) collapses to the standard
moment equality restriction. The question is nevertheless whether (12) yields more
identifying power than (11), which is not quaranteed a priori, since as illustrated in
the motivating example in Section 2, it depends on the data generating process.
4.0.1. Identification Analysis. While I briefly lay out the identification framework
based on moment inequalities, in Appendix A I establish the general conditions under
13 As I will illustrate in the empirical application, combining information from different surveys is
one fruitful way.
14Appendix A includes a more formal proof.
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which additional moment inequalities are informative for the parameters of interest.
First, conditions like (11) and (12) can be re-expressed as moment equalities:
(13) E
ˆ
g
rˆ1
pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λt
rˆ1
opYt, Yt`1, θq
˙
φpYτ´1q “ EµtφpYτ´1q ” U P r0,8q
where φp.q is an inequality preserving function of Yτ´1, r is the number of conditions
and U is a vector of nuisance parameters that restore the moment equality. From an
economic point of view, the set of model completions is simply the set of all possible
mechanisms that generate the wedge µt such that U ě 0. The identified set is thus
defined as follows:
ΘI :“
#
θ P Θ : DU P
ą
r
R`;E pmpYt, Yt`1, θqφpYt´1qq ´ U “ 0
+
(14)
where mpYt, Yt`1, θq :“ pg pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λot pYt, Yt`1, θqq.
The next proposition characterizes how informative Bt can be within the context of
limited information moment restrictions. If it constrains the stochastic properties of
µt as implied by (11) , then the size of ΘI is likely to be refined.
Proposition 1. Identification with Bt. Given Theorem 2 in Appendix A,
(1) If Bˆt ÝÑ
NÑ8 Bt P p0, 1q, Θ
1
I Ă ΘI .
(2) If V arpBˆtq ÝÑ
N,TÑ8 V arpBtq “ 0, then Θ
1
I “ ΘI .
(3) Impossibility of point identification: When Bt ‰ 0, ΘI is not a singleton
Proof. See Appendix 
Bt P p0, 1q is essential for shrinking the admissible set of predictions. Moreover,
absence of time variation in the proportion of agents that are constrained i.e. if the
economy reaches the stationary state, implies that Bt has no additional information
for the parameters of the model.
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Other micro moments. The advantage of the second order approximation to the HA
model is that it makes clear which moments are likely to be important. In this
particular case, the micro moment that is necessary for identifying the structural pa-
rameters of interest is the cross sectional variance of consumption. Since consumption
is a nonlinear function of wealth, this is equivalent to using the corresponding mo-
ment from the wealth distribution. On the other hand, sharpening inference without
compromising credibility requires information on Bt and κt. In the application that
follows, we will combine information from different sources to identify Bt.
5. The case of Spain
This section applies the above analysis to the case of Spain, as it is a country in which
financial frictions are a priori expected to have played a significant role post 1999,
and especially during 2008-2014.
I will employ moment conditions that correspond to the model in (1) where I also
allow for external habit formation e.g. "catching up with the Joneses" effects and disu-
tility in hours worked which is separable from utility in consumption. The employed
individual utility function is therefore as follows:
upci,t, li,t, Ctq :“ pci,t ´ hCt´1q
1´ω ´ 1
1´ ω ´
l1`ηi,t
1` η
The two individual first order conditions that are relevant for identification are the
Euler equation and the intratemporal labor supply condition:
pci,t ´ hCt´1q´ω “ βEt pci,t`1 ´ hCtq´ω Rt`1 ` λi,t
lηi,t “ WtPt c
´ω
i,t
where we have used that Byi,tpli,tqBli,t “ WtPt , that is, the derivative of total individual
income with respect to hours worked is the real wage. The parameters of interest are
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therefore pω, β, η, hq, the coefficient of risk aversion, the discount factor, the (inverse)
Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the habit parameter respectively.
The corresponding aggregated moment conditions (without Bt) are as follows15:
E
ˆ
pCt ´ hCt´1q´ω ´ βpCt`1 ´ hCtq´ω
ˆ
Ξt,t`1
Ξt
˙
pi´1t`1Rt`1
˙
Yt´1 ě 0(15)
E
ˆ
Lt ´ w
1
η
t pCt ´ hCt´1q´
ω
η Ξlabt
˙
Yt´1 “ 0(16)
where
Ξt “ 1` ωp1` ωq2
ˆ
1´ h
ˆ
Ct´1
Ct
˙˙´2
V ct
and
Ξlabt “ 1` ωpη ` ωq2η2
ˆ
1´ h
ˆ
Ct´1
Ct
˙˙´2
V ct
where V ct :“ V art
´
ci,t
Ct
¯
.
5.0.1. Measurement issues. As evident from the analysis in the previous section, being
able to measure Bt improves identification and it is therefore useful to first discuss
pertinent measurement issues and how they can be addressed. The exact measure of
Bt is computed from the Survey of Household Finances (SHF) and its corresponding
95% confidence bands are plotted in Figure 2. This measure asks households whether
they have been denied a loan application during this period16 but is nevertheless
available every three years. In order to obtain a quarterly measure, I utilize monthly
data from the Business and Consumer Survey (BCS) of the European Commission17.
In particular, the survey asks the households about their financial situation, and the
possible answers range from "We are saving a lot" to "We are running into debt". In
15See Appendix B for the derivations.
16Accounting for consumers that have not applied for loans because they expect to be rejected (also
coined as "discouraged borrowers" in Cox and Jappelli (1993) ) or consumers that were granted a
fraction of the requested loan does not affect the estimate of this proportion.
17BCS data can be downloaded from here.
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Figure 2, I plot the proportion that corresponds to the latter category (those that
claim to be getting indebted), which increased from 5% in 2008 to 10% by the end of
2016. This is an an upper bound to the true fraction of households that are likely to
face borrowing constraints within the quarter, as some of those (already into) getting
into debt may (have been) be denied a loan application, partially or in total.
To infer the true proportion of constrained households for the periods in which it
is not observed, so all periods between the triennial measure from SHF, I employ a
mixed frequency model, where the quarterly observations on consumers running into
debt are linked to the triennial exact measure.
Figure 2
Letting Bt be the exact measure and Πt the proportion of consumers running into
debt, then Bt “ ζtΠt where ζt P p0, 1q, as the agents that hit the minimum level of
permissible debt are a fraction of the total measure of indebted households. As shown
in the appendix, this serves as a measurement equation in a mixed frequency state
space model. The extracted measure is plotted in Figure 2.
Since this measure is primarily informed from the SHF survey, one might still be con-
cerned that the latter might under-state the true measure of constrained households.
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As I have argued in 2.2.2, the SHF measure is consistent with a variety of underlying
reasons for which credit was denied and in the state-space formulation we used, we
control for measurement error. More importantly, notice that even if Bˆt Ñ B˜t ď Bt,
the moment inequality restrictions are still valid as:
mtB˜
´1
t ě mtB´1t
∴
EpmtB˜´1t Xt´1q ě EpmtB´1t Xt´1q ě 0
where mt :“
´
pCt ´ hCt´1q´ω ´ βEtpCt`1 ´ hCtq´ω
´
Ξt,t`1
Ξt
¯
pi´1t`1Rt`1
¯
.
Finally, another variable that needs to be measured from micro data is consumption
dispersion Vc,t. I construct two different measures, one from the Survey of Household
Finances (SHF) and one from the Household Budget Survey (HBS)18. In order to
impute the value of Vc,t when it is latent, I make the simplifying assumption that it
is constant. This is not likely to be a detrimental assumption for this kind of exercise
as consumption is smoother than income, and its distribution is a slowly moving
variable19.
Estimation. In the estimation results that follow, I examine whether additional mo-
ment conditions generated by utilizing the measure of Bt are informative for structural
parameter estimates obtained using limited information methods, providing therefore
empirical support to Proposition 1. I compare the confidence sets for all the structural
parameters when using the extensive margin as additional information and when not
using it, for the two measures of cross sectional consumption variance.
18HBS Data can downloaded from here and SHF data from here. Please consult the appendix for a
detailed explanation of how the measure is constructed.
19See for example in Anghel (2018) (Figure 13).
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The table below presents the (projections) of the 95% joint confidence set obtained
using quantiles from the posterior draws of the objective function as in Chen, Chris-
tensen, and Tamer (2018) while in Appendix B I specify the prior distributions.
Table 1. Robust Confidence Set for Preference Parameters
with B - SHF without B - SHF with B - HBS without B - HBS
q2.5% q97.5% q2.5% q97.5% q2.5% q97.5% q2.5% q97.5%
ω 0.3421 15.6193 0.2514 18.5916 0.5312 15.2901 0.2232 18.5544
η 0.0139 2.3734 0.0044 4.1882 0.0266 1.9627 0.0077 4.2942
β 0.9800 0.9849 0.9800 1.0000 0.9800 0.9850 0.9800 1.0000
h 0.0001 0.9113 0.001 0.9585 0.0000 0.8862 0.0000 0.9510
As expected, the moment inequality approach delivers wide confidence sets, that is,
credibility comes at a cost. Nevertheless, what is really important here is that infor-
mation from micro-survey data does matter. Accounting for the constrained agents
shrinks the confidence sets across all cases. As in the introductory example, the
set of admissible values becomes smaller. Had we neglected the extensive margin of
constrained consumers smaller values of risk aversion would be admissible. Impa-
tient agents can drive the equilibrium rate upwards, which validates a lower upper
bound on β since β ă R´1. Moreover, the upper bound on η becomes smaller. The
smallest admissible value for the Frisch elasticity becomes higher when we control for
the extensive margin. If all agents are constrained, then aggregate consumption is
very responsive to fluctuations in the wage, which implies that fluctuations in em-
ployment are driven primarily by the wealth effect. If only a fraction of consumers
are constrained, the substitution effect is more likely to dominate, leading to larger
admissible values for the Frisch elasticity.
6. Conclusion
This paper has shown that within the context of economies with financial frictions,
the identification of structural parameters can be robust to alternative mechanisms
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that can generate these frictions and the corresponding heterogeneity in individual
outcomes. While set identification can result in wide confidence sets, the paper shows
that additional distributional information can be useful in shrinking the identified set.
Nevertheless, identification of the micro-moments that are required to make inference
more precise is not void of challenges as micro data is usually available at much lower
frequencies than macroeconomic data. The paper has explored one way of dealing
with this by exploiting information from different surveys in a mixed frequency setting
to identify the borrowing constrained consumers. Empirically, this information seems
to matter for all structural parameters.
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7. Appendix A
7.1. Constrained versus Unconstrained Consumption. Notice that for large
values of xt, Cinct and C
per.for
t become parallel, as expected.
Figure 3. Example of Optimal Consumption in Incomplete Markets
7.2. Deriving Consumption Growth. When the household is constrained, cconi,t “
xi,t while unconstrained consumption is equal to cunci,t “ p1`r´ρq1`r xi,t. The latter is
parallel to the perfect foresight solution, cpfi,t “ p1 ` r ´ ρqai,t ` 1`r´ρ1`r pyi,t ` y¯ir q “
p1`r´ρq
1`r pxi,t ` y¯ir q where p1`r´ρq1`r y¯ir is interpreted as the share of permanent income
(y¯i ” Eyi,t) that is channeled to precautionary savings20. Using the constrained
agent’s Euler equation, it has to be the case that ρxi,t “ Epci,t`1|λi,t ą 0q ´ λi,t.
Expectations include the possibilities of being constrained or not in t` 1, thus:
ρxi,t “ Epci,t`1|λi,t ą 0q ´ λi,t
“ Epxi,t`1|λi,t ą 0qPpλi,t`1 ą 0|λi,t ą 0q
20See Carroll (2001) and Figure 3 for an example of a numerical solution that verifies this.
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`
ˆ
1´ ρ1` r
˙
Epxi,t`1|λi,t ą 0qPpλi,t`1 “ 0|λi,t ą 0q ´ λi,t
“ Epxi,t`1|λi,t ą 0q
„
1´ ρ1` rPpλi,t`1 “ 0|λi,t ą 0q

´ λi,t
“ y¯i
„
1´ ρ1` rPpλi,t`1 “ 0|λi,t ą 0q

´ λi,t
“ y¯i
„
1´ ρ1` r p1´ Fyipx
‹
i qq

´ λi,t
where in the last two lines we use that cash on hand in t ` 1 if constrained at t is
equal to yi,t`1 whose expected value is y¯i, while the probability of being constrained
in t ` 1 is Fyipx‹i q, x‹ being the cash on hand threshold. Thus, λi,t “ ´ρxi,t `
y¯
“
1´ ρ1`r p1´ Fyipx‹i qq
‰
and
∆cinci,t`1 “ ρ˜ci,t ` t`1 ` 1pλi,t ą 0q
ˆ
´ρci,t ` y¯i
ˆ
1´ ρ1` r p1´ Fyipx
‹
i qq
˙˙
:“ ρ˜ci,t ` t`1 ` 1pλi,t ą 0q pλ1ci,t ` λ0,iq
7.3. Alternative Derivation to Hall (1978). Following Commault (2019), con-
sider the Euler equation:
U 1
´
pβp1` rqq 1ω ci,t
¯
“ EtU 1pci,t`1q ` pβp1` rqq´1λi,t
pβp1` rqq 1ω ci,t “ U 1´1
`
U 1pEtci,t`1 ´ φi,tq ` pβp1` rqq´1λi,t
˘
where φi,t ą 0 if marginal utility is convex. A first order approximation of the RHS
around λi,t “ 0 yields:
pβp1` rqq 1ω ci,t « Etci,t`1 ´ φi,t ´ λ˜i,t
where λ˜i,t “ ´ pβp1`rqq´1λi,t
U2ppβp1`rqq 1ω ci,tq
ą 0. The distortion to random walk comes from both
the precautionary savings effect and occasionally binding constraint. Repeating the
analysis in 7.2 yields that:
λi,t ` φi,t “ y¯i
„
1´ ρ1` r p1´ Fi,ypx
‹
i qq

´ ρxi,t, and
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∆cinci,t`1 “ ρ˜ci,t ` t`1 ` 1pλi,t ą 0q
ˆ
´ρci,t ` y¯i
ˆ
1´ ρ1` r p1´ Fyipx
‹qq
˙˙
` 1pλi,t “ 0qφi,t
Finally, the bound derived in Section 2.1 is identical because φi,t and Covpφi,t, yi,tq
have the same sign as λi,t and Covpλi,t, yi,tq respectively.
7.4. Proofs for results in main text.
Proof. of Result (8)
Let pi,t :“ Ptpλi,t ą 0q. If ρ˜IV is admissible, evaluating the LHS of (7) at the true
ρ˜ “ ρ´ 1 and the RHS at ρ˜IV , and solving for pi,t:
pi,t ď Φi,tpv ´ ρ˜ci,tq ´ Φi,tpv ´ ρ˜IV ci,tqΦi,tpv ´ ρ˜ci,tq ´ Φi,tpv ´ λ0 ´ pρ˜` λ1qci,tq :“ gppi,tq
The function gppi,tq satisfies gp0q “ 0 (and gp1q “ 1 when y¯ “ 1). 
Proof. of Results (11) and (12)
(1) Starting from the moment function which is separable in λot ,
g pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λot pYt, Yt`1, θq “ µt
where µt is positive or negative, then multiplying by Xt´1 ą 0 maintains the same
sign. Taking unconditional expectations we conclude.
(2) Since µt “ κtBt, dividing both sides by Bt and taking unconditional expectations
with Xt´1 we conclude.

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7.5. Identification: Limited Information Framework. I first define two notions
that will be helpful for the proposition that follows:
Definition 1. Denote mpYt, Yt`1, θq as correctly specified if there exists θ0 P Θ such
that if U “ 0, EmpYt, Yt`1, θ0q “ 0.
Definition 2. For some U PŚ
r
R`, θ1pUq is conditionally identified if there does not
exist any other θ P Θ, θ2pUq such that EmpYt, Yt`1, θ1pUqq “ EmpYt, Yt`1, θ2pUqq.
The first ensures that the identified set is not empty, while the second guarantees that
more information on the wedge U leads to a smaller identified set for θ. Given these
definitions, Theorem 2 establishes that fixing a value for the wedge U , there exists a
unique value for θ, defined as θpUq, that satisfies (13). Any additional information is
likely to make the identified set smaller.
Theorem 2. ΘI when r “ nθ
Under correct specification of mp.q and conditional identification,
D! mapping G : ΘI “ G´1pUq XΘ
Proof. Fix U
nθˆ1
P pU, U¯ s. Assuming conditional identification, there is a unique value
of θ˚ such that EmpYt, Yt`1, θ˚q ” Gpθ˚q “ U
nθˆ1
. Thus, ΘI “ ΘX G´1pUq. 
7.5.1. The use of additional conditions. I distinguish between moments mα,tpθq, the
necessary moments functions for Theorem 2 being true, and mβ,tpθq the additional
moment functions where for notational brevity, I have dropped the dependence on
Yτ´1. In addition, let mˆα,tpθq :“ mα,tpθqφt and mˆβ,tpθq :“ mβ,tpθqφt, mˆαpθq and
mˆβpθq the corresponding vectors, and m¯αpθq and m¯βpθq the vector means. Let W be
a real valued, possibly data dependent matrix, diagonal in pWα,Wβq. Furthermore,
denote by Qα the conditional expectation operator when conditioning on W
1
2T
α mˆαpθq
and by QKα the residual operator.
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The following proposition specifies that additional moments have to be less than
perfectly correlated with the necessary conditions for the identified set to be smaller.
Theorem 3. For Ut “
 
Ut P rU, U¯ s
(
define
U ct “
!
Ut P rU, U¯ s : EQKα
´
W
1
2T
β mβpθpUqq ´ Ut
¯
“ 0
)
Then, Θ1I Ă ΘI iff U ct Ă Ut
Proof. Denote the moment conditions using ny macroeconomic variables by q1pθ,Yτ´1q
and moment conditions using k “ r ´ ny survey variables by q2pθ,Yτ´1q:
q1pθ,Yτ´1q
nyˆ1
“ V1pYτ´1q P rVpYtq1, V¯pYtq1s
q2pθ,Yτ´1q
pny´kqˆ1
“ V2pYτ´1q P rVpYtq2, V¯pYtq2s
which imply the following unconditional moment equalities :
Eppq1pθ,Yτ´1q ´ V1pYτ´1qφtq “ 0
Eppq2pθ,Yτ´1q ´ V2pYτ´1qφtq “ 0
Denote this vector of moment conditions by m. Partition the vector m ” pmTα ,mTβ qT
where mα contains the first nθ moments. Since r ą nθ, and given a weighting matrix
W , the first order conditions are as follows:
EJpθqT pW 12Tα mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ Vtqφt “ 0
where the Jacobian Jpθq
rˆnθ
has full rank. To economize on notation, redefine the weights
after pre-multiplication with the Jacobian, which implies that:
EpW 12Tα mα `W
1
2T
β mβq ´ Unθˆ1 “ 0
This is a projection of m on a lower dimensional subspace. Since W is an arbitrary
matrix, and pmα,mβq are possibly correlated, we reproject the sum onto the space
spanned byW
1
2T
α mα. Denote the projectionQα :“ W
1
2T
α mαpmTαW Tα mαq´1mTαW
1
2
α and
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QKα the orthogonal projection. Since the original sum satisfies the moment condition,
then the two orthogonal complements will also satisfy it:
Qα
´
W
1
2T
α mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ W 12Tα mα `Qα
´
W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ 0
QKα
´
W
1
2T
α mα `W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ QKα
´
W
1
2T
β mβ ´ U
¯
“ 0
where U P
”
W
1
2T
α VpYtqα `W
1
2T
β VpYtqβ, W
1
2T
α V¯pYtqα `W
1
2T
β V¯pYtqβ
ı
b φt
As in Theorem 2 the first set of restrictions identifies a one to one mapping from
U to ΘI , and therefore θ˚pUq ” G´1pUq. Plugging this in the second set of restric-
tions eliminates dependence on mα and imposes further restrictions on the domain of
variation of U . The admissible set for U is now
!
U P p´ inf, U¯q : QKα
´
W
1
2T
β mβpUq ´ U
¯
“ 0
)
Therefore, Dθ P θpUq : θ R ΘIpU 1q and consequently Θ1I Ă ΘI . The same result carries
through if we replace the linear projection with conditional expectations. Letting Qα
be the conditional expectation operator implies that any integrable moment function
m can be decomposed as m “ Qαm`QKαm such that Qαpm´Qαmq “ 0. 
Proof. of Proposition 1
(1): When Bt “ 0, E pg pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λot pYt, Yt`1, θqqXt´1 “ 0 which trivially restores
point identification. When Bt “ 1, (13) collapses to (12).
sign pE pg pYt, Yt`1, θq ´ λot pYt, Yt`1, θqqXt´1q “ sign pEpκtXt´1qq “ sign pEpµtXt´1qq
For Bt P p0, 1q, the moment conditions in (12) and (13) are not perfectly correlated
as Corrpκt, µtq “ Corrpκt, Btκtq ‰ 1. By Theorem 3 we conclude.
(2): If V arpBtq “ 0, then Corrpκt, Btκtq “ 1.
(3): Suppose that ΘI is a singleton. Then it must be that the RHS of (13) is zero:
Either Bt “ 0 for all t, or ppsi,t|Stq has unit mass on one agent who is unconstrained,
and thus Bt “ 0 as well. 
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7.6. Mixed Frequency Model for Quarterly Bt. Using b˜t “ p˜it` ζ˜t as a measure-
ment equation, the true (log) quarterly proportion of liquidity constrained consumers
is extracted using the following mixed frequency Gaussian linear state space model,
where t “ 4pj ´ 1q ` q, t is the quarterly observation at year j and q “ t1, 2, 3, 4u the
within year quarter index:
State Equation (ignoring identities):¨˝
b˜4pjq
ζ˜4pjq
‚˛ “
¨˝
ρb 0
0 ρζ
‚˛¨˝ b˜4pj´1q`3
ζ˜4pj´1q`3
‚˛`
¨˝
νb˜,4pjq
νζ˜,4pjq
‚˛
Observation equation:
¨˝
p˜io4pjq
b˜oj
‚˛ “
¨˝
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ... 0
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8
1
8 0 0 ... 0
‚˛
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
b˜4pjq
b˜4pj´1q`3
b˜4pj´1q`2
b˜4pj´1q`1
b˜4pj´1q
b˜4pj´2q`3
b˜4pj´2q`2
b˜4pj´2q`1
ζ˜4pj´1q`3
ζ˜4pj´1q`2
ζ˜4pj´1q`1
ζ˜4pj´2q
ζ˜4pj´2q`3
ζ˜4pj´2q`2
ζ˜4pj´2q`1
ζ˜4pj´2q
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
` v4pjq
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where pνb˜,t, νζ˜,tq „ Np0, diagpΣνqq and vt „ Np0, diagpΣvqq. The last diagonal com-
ponent of Σv is calibrated to the standard error from the estimation of Bt in the
SHF survey. The rest of the components of the diagonal are calibrated to 1% of the
variance of the BCS measure (p˜it).
8. Appendix B
8.1. Derivations with external Habits in Consumption. With external habit
formation, the utility of the household becomes as follows:
upci,t, li,t, Ctq :“
˜
pci,t ´ hCt´1q1´ω ´ 1
1´ ω ´
l1`ηi,t
1` η
¸
and the corresponding Euler equation is:
pci,t ´ hCt´1q´ω “ βEt pci,t`1 ´ hCtq´ω pi´1t`1Rt`1 ` µi,t
Expanding individual consumption around aggregate consumption, we have that
ˆ
pci,t`1 ´ hCtq´ω ppsi,t|Stqdsi,t u pCt`1 ´ hCtq´ω
ˆ
1` ωpω ` 1q2 pCt ´ hCt´1q
´2V artpci,tq
˙
:“ pCt`1 ´ hCtq´ω Ξtphq
In particular, the bond Euler equation becomes:
pCt ´ hCt´1q´ω Ξtphq “ βEt pCt`1 ´ hCtq´ω Ξt`1phqpi´1t`1Rt`1 `
ˆ
µi,tppsi,t|Stqdsi,t
Correspondingly, the aggregate intratemporal condition becomes:
ˆ
li,tppsi,t|Stqdsi,t “ w
1
η
t pci,t ´ hCt´1q´
ω
η
“ w
1
η
t pCt ´ hCt´1q´
ω
η
ˆ
1` ωpω ` ηq2η2 pCt ´ hCt´1q
´2V artpci,tq
˙
” w
1
η
t pCt ´ hCt´1q´
ω
η Ξlabt
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8.2. Priors.
Table 2. Priors for ΘFI
Θ Prior Θ Prior
ω Inv ´Gammap3, 2q η Inv ´Gammap2, 0.6q
β Up0.98, 1q h Betap1.2, 1.2q
8.3. Consumption Dispersion: SHF versus HBS. Two measures of durable and
non durable consumption dispersion are used using data from two different surveys.
More specifically, for the SHF, we compute the variance of annual nominal consump-
tion, using survey weights, computed as follows:
cnom,annuali,t “ 12 ˚ pImputed Monthly Rentrcode : 2.31s
`Car Purchases{12rcode : 2.74s ` House Durables{12rcode : p2.70s
`monthly non durable consumptionrcode : p9.1sq
To convert it to the real consumption ratio, I divide by aggregate consumption. For
the Household Budget Survey, I compute the variance of total consumption expendi-
ture (code: GASTOT, for those who do not report zero total income), which is itself
a weighted measure of consumption expenditure for the representative household of
a particular classification. To convert it to the real consumption ratio, I divide by
aggregate consumption. Notice also the survey switched from the COICOP to the
ECOICOP classification in 2016.
Figure 4 plots the demeaned measures of consumption dispersion computed from the
triennial Spanish Survey of Household Finances (SHF), and the annual Household
Budget Survey (HBS). The two series have a similar pattern over time while the SHF
31
measure exhibits sharper falls in 2009 and in 2015. As evident in Figure 4 this can
be attributed to durable consumption.
Figure 4
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